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Abstract
Traditional paper checks have been estimated to cost US banks over $2.1 billion dollars a
year to process [1]. Much of the cost is due to the time and fees related to human
intervention and the physical transport of a check. Gupta and Palacios [15] have defined a
web-based check processing mechanism; this paper extends the framework they have
developed and defines a cryptographic protocol for the transmission of digital checks
using cryptographic building blocks like public key encryption and digital signatures.
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1. Introduction
A check is a fairly simple instrument - a properly signed check represents a one-way
transfer of money from one account to another - yet US banks spend over $2.1 billion
dollars each year to process checks, and the banking industry estimates that a check is
processed, on average, about 2.6 times before making it back to the payer in a monthly
statement [1]. A check is first deposited at the recipient's bank, where it runs through an
electronic check reader and check sorter. The check writer's bank, bank account, and the
check number are encoded on the check in magnetic MICR ink. The check reader and
sorter read this MICR ink and sort checks according to the check writer's bank.
Employees at bank processing centers manually read in the dollar amount off the check
and then print the number on the bottom of the check using MICR ink. This MICR ink
can be read easily and is used along with the numbers at the bottom of the check to sort
the check at each bank. The check must be returned from the depositor's bank to the
check writer's bank so that it may be included in the check writer's next bank statement.
The $2.1 billion spent annually by US banks boils down to $1-5 per check [23]. The
majority of the per-check processing cost is due to the expense of physically processing
the check, not the fees assessed for the actual electronic funds transfer. ACH fees average
about 25 basis points, or 0.25% of the dollar amount of the transaction [24]. For checks
under $200, this fee amounts to less than $0.50. There are a number of costs associated
with the traditional physical processing of a check:
The cost of reading the check amount and imprinting this amount in MICR ink on
the bottom of a check.
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The cost of sending the check to the check writer's bank
The check writer's bank must then sort the check and place it into the check
writer's monthly statement.
The cost of shipping the checks from the depositor's bank to the check writer's bank
totals more than $250 million a year [2]. The system is currently in flux; some banks do
not insert the physical check into the check-writer's bank statement, and instead only
show an electronic image, but, regardless, there are still significant costs associated with
check processing. This thesis, in combination with the Web-Based Check Processing
architecture built by Palacios and Gupta [15], details a new method of reducing the per-
check processing costs via electronic check transmission.
2. Alternate Money Transfer Systems
There have been viable and secure alternatives to checks for over 25 years now. The
section below outlines several alternatives to paper checks and discusses previously
related work.
2.1 Paypal
PayPal is one of the most successful online money transfer systems. It ties together credit
card accounts and e-mail addresses; anyone with an e-mail address can send money to
anyone else. PayPal began as a service used primarily to pay for goods purchased at the
popular online shopping side EBay [14].
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To send money via PayPal, a user simply registers his e-mail address with the PayPal
servers. The servers verify the e-mail address by sending an unencrypted, unsigned e-
mail to the user. The e-mail contains a random number that only the PayPal servers and
the user know, and this shared secret is used to authenticate the user. Once the e-mail
address has been confirmed, the user then connects to PayPal via a secure HTTPS
connection and links a credit card number with their e-mail address. If the user wishes to
transfer money from their account to another user, they notify the central PayPal
computers of the recipient's e-mail address and the amount. If the recipient is not
registered with PayPal, they must go through a parallel e-mail address confirmation and
credit card linking process. PayPal debits the sender's credit card for the specified
amount, and then credits the recipient's card.
PayPal is far from a bulletproof solution to Internet payment processing. PayPal's major
weakness is that its own security is predicated upon the security of two of its major
building blocks: the security of the Internet e-mail transfer system, and the security of the
credit card payment system. If an attacker can intercept a user's e-mail, they can initiate
money transfers in that user's name with impunity. It's not a trivial problem to intercept
e-mail, but it is far from an intractable problem. PayPal also leverages the existing credit
card billing infrastructure. Credit card numbers can be easily stolen, though this is of little
concern for PayPal; the credit card companies (i.e. Visa, MasterCard, et al) shoulder
much of the burden for any fraudulent credit card transactions.
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2.2 CheckFree
A consumer-to-business (recurring) transaction consists of payments that individuals
make to commercial establishments on a regular basis; for example, phone bills or
electric bills. Currently, Checkfree (www.checkfree.com) is the leading solution to the
consumer-to-business problem. Checkfree allows users to access and pay their bills over
the Internet free of charge to any one of Checkfree's 260 subscriber companies. The
service is offered for free because the subscriber companies pay Checkfree a fee for its
services. Checkfree offers a second service which allows users to make payments to
anybody, not just the 260 subscriber companies, but this service costs users anywhere
from 0 to 15 dollars a month for a set of transactions. The reason for this is that electronic
payments are not possible for payees who are not subscribers to the CheckFree service.
Instead, a paper check is printed and physically mailed to the intended recipient using the
information and payment amount submitted to service provider. The cost of the printing
and mailing of the checks is covered by the users' $15 fee. [14]
2.3 Debit Cards
A consumer-to-business (one-time) transaction consists primarily of one-time payments
for goods and services; for example groceries or gifts. Previously, bank checks or credit
cards were the only options for these types of transactions, but the creation of the debit
card provided a better solution [14]. A debit card is similar to a bank check in that money
is withdrawn from a user's account, but it does not require any paper or handwriting.
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Rather, the debit card is swiped like a credit card, and money is automatically withdrawn
from the user's account.
A debit card's security entirely depends on the security of the debit card user's PIN. If
anyone has this secret PIN, then they can initiate a money transfer.
2.4 Direct Deposit
A business-to-consumer payment consists of payments made by businesses, usually
employers, to individuals. These might include payments for salaries or bonuses [14].
The current solution to the business-to-consumer problem is Direct Deposit. While many
employees still receive paper checks for their salaries, the overwhelming majority have
chosen to use Direct Deposit to electronically deposit their salary directly into their bank
account.
2.5 Singapore's Electronic Checking System
The four solutions above have described excellent alternatives to the paper check, but the
reality is that paper checks are still an integral part of our economy today. Despite the
various alternatives to paper checks, people are still choosing to use the old fashioned
check. Since the exorbitant costs associated with paper a check lie in the processing that
requires human intervention and the physical transfer of a check, an ideal solution would
involve eliminating these factors [13].
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In June 1999 BCS/BCSIS was directed to develop an electronic check processing system
for all of Singapore [4]. Singapore is a tiny country--the maximum distance that a check
needs to go is 20 miles--but despite its small size, it still suffers from the same logistical
problems and substantial costs related to paper checks as a larger country does.
Checks are scanned and MICR data are captured at the receiving bank branch. The
information is then transmitted to the Singapore Automatic Clearing House (SACH). The
SACH continually reads received checks via OCR and makes successfully scanned
checks available for processing almost instantly. Checks that could not be successfully
scanned are queued for manual recognition.
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3. Previous Work: Gupta and Palacios
Despite the various alternatives to paper checks, people still choose to use the old
fashioned check. Since the exorbitant costs associated with paper a check lie in the
processing that requires human intervention and the physical transfer of a check, an ideal
solution would involve eliminating these factors [13].
Gupta and Palacios [15] have developed a novel prototype that provides a framework for
a secure web-based check processing architecture. This framework involves three parties:
the check depositor's bank, the central check processing server, and the check-writer's
bank (also called the check originator's bank). All communication occurs via HTTPS
connections over a web browser to a central server. This section describes Gupta and
Palacios's framework. Section 6 of this thesis will describe this thesis' improvements to
Gupta and Palacios's framework.
3.1 Check Submission
When a customer deposits a check at a bank branch, it is that bank's responsibility to
scan in the check and OCR the check's contents. The following attributes are the most
important aspects of the check:
Branch ID
Account number
Check number
Amount
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The branch ID, account number, and check number are encoded on the check using well-
established MICR technology; the ink is actually magnetically charged, and is easy for
machines to read. The OCR software must read both the CAB (courtesy amount block)
numeral amount and the LAB (legal amount block) written amount, and reconcile any
differences between the CAB and LAB to arrive at a single, correct check amount.
As of 1996, OCR check recognition software could achieve 90-95% accuracy rates [20].
The sensitivity curve of the OCR software is extremely important. Because this is a
financial application, it is extremely important that the check amount, as read by OCR
software, be accurate. Palacios and Gupta [15] provide extensive background on OCR of
check data; this is already a well-researched problem, and check OCR software is
believed to be significantly robust that commercial check amount OCR is a viable
solution.
If the check can't be automatically read in, it is the depositor's bank's responsibility to
manually key in the check data. There will presumably be some cost associated with this
electronic data entry. While it is the depositor's bank's responsibility to translate the
check from its printed form to an easy-to-transfer electronic form, it is perhaps
unreasonable to expect the depositor to shoulder the entire burden of electronically
transcribing a check. While the specific details are likely to be a source of contention, it is
reasonable for the check writer's bank to split the expense and partially defray the cost of
processing the check.
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3.2 Clearing a check
According to Palacios and Gupta [15] a representative of each bank must check the
centralized check processing system daily for pending checks. The representative must
verify the electronic check amount with the check image and then, if the check-writer's
bank account contains sufficient funds, approve the check. This clearing process
generates a "clear code" that is used as proof of the depositing bank's acceptance of the
deposit. This clear code is used as a warranty that the transaction has been approved.
Section 6 of this thesis will further refine this protocol and will cryptographically define
the "clear code."
3.3 Obtaining the Clear Code
Branches should check the system at any time to check and see whether the checks they
submitted have been cleared for deposit by the bank. If there is a valid "clear code," then
the branch can proceed with the instantaneous wire transfer.
3.4 Wire Transfer
The bank that clears the check did not initiate the transfer of funds when it cleared the
check; according the mutual agreement between all member banks, a bank only has the
obligation to validate its checks within one day. When the check is cleared, the check-
writer's bank deducts the money from the customer's account, and then places that
money in a holding account where it is held until the depositor's bank initiates the funds
14
transfer process. The check writer's bank then waits for a wire transfer request from the
depositor with this "clear code."
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4. Goals of A Secure Check System
As stated before, the purpose of this paper is to describe a system by which electronic
checks can be securely transferred over the Internet. Before the details of the system
design are discussed, it is worthwhile to clearly outline the system goals. This section
outlines the high level goals that a robust solution should achieve.
4.1 Encryption
Given the sensitive material that electronic checks contain, there is an obvious need for a
secure system by which data can be transferred. The first and most obvious necessity in
the system is a method for encrypting or encapsulating the data. The encryption of data is
analogous to a "briefcase passing" model: a check is stored inside a briefcase, but the
briefcase can only be locked an unlocked by the sender and the receiver, respectively
[21]. The sender writes a check, locks it in a brief case, and passes the briefcase to a
carrier who does not know what is inside the briefcase and cannot unlock the briefcase to
find out. This carrier passes it to another carrier who passes it to another and so on, until
the briefcase finally arrives in the hands of the receiver. The receiver can then unlock the
briefcase to obtain his check. Despite the many hands that the briefcase passed
through-nobody but the sender and the receiver know what was stored inside.
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4.2 Flexibility
Aside from the actual encryption of data, the system should also offerflexibility. That is,
if changes occur in the check processing route, the system should not require redesign or
extensive modification. For example, the Federal Reserve has recently tried to implement
changes in the check processing system. Specifically, "the Fed says the new system will
allow images of checks to be available to any system users shortly after they've been
scanned by the Fed... no matter where the item enters the archive it can be accessed from
anywhere in the country" [9]. Presumably more changes will be made in the future due to
new legislation or simply due to growth in the checking system, so this system should
offer secure methods of data transfer that are applicable even after changes have been
made to the routing process.
4.3 Scalability
Another feature that is important to consider is scalability. Ideally, this system should
work for both small and large checking environments. For example, the system should
work for a country with a small geographic area, like Singapore, and for a country that
has a large geographic area, like the United States. Along the same lines, a design for a
secure checking system should facilitate growing checking systems. If a country's
checking system is expanding, the system should provide a simple way to incorporate the
new growth to the system.
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4.4 Authentication
Finally, as in any secure system, the system should include authentication. That is, the
system should guarantee that each party is who it claims to be for every communication
made during a secure session. For example, if a particular check processing unit wants to
pass secure information to its presiding Federal Reserve Board, the system should
guarantee the check processing unit that it is indeed talking to the federal reserve board
and not some other third party. Similarly, the system should guarantee the Federal
Reserve Board that the information being received is indeed coming from the check
processing unit and not an unknown third party.
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5. Cryptographic Background
Before the encryption scheme is described in detail, some background on encryption is in
order. This section defines the terms symmetric key encryption, asymmetric key
encryption, hash functions, and digital signing.
First, there are two types of encryption: symmetric and asymmetric. Symmetric key
encryption was developed first and differs from asymmetric key encryption because it
uses the same key to encrypt and decrypt files. Secure applications that require
passwords, such as most email applications, use symmetric key encryption. A simple
example of symmetric key encryption is: two users Alice and Bob decide on the
password "2", and they decide to encrypt messages by changing every letter to be the 2"d
letter after the original letter. For example, "apple" would become "crrng" because "c" is
the second letter after " "ra" is the second letter after "p", and so on. To decrypt
messages, they simply change every letter in the encrypted message to be the 2nd letter
before the encrypted letter (so "c" becomes "a", "r" becomes "p", and so on). This is
called symmetric key encryption because the same key, "2", is used to encrypt and
decrypt messages. Some common algorithms used for symmetric key encryption are
DES, triple-DES, and AES.
Conversely, asymmetric key encryption does not use the same key to encrypt and decrypt
messages. The most common form of asymmetric key encryption is public key
encryption. Public key encryption works this way: every user has 2 keys, a public key
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that anyone can obtain and a private key that the user keeps secret. Any user can send a
message to another user, Bob, by encrypting the message with Bob's public key. When
Bob receives the encrypted message, he decrypts it with his private key. This method of
encryption is called asymmetric key encryption because different keys are used to encrypt
and decrypt messages. The defacto algorithm used for public key encryption today is the
RSA algorithm.
The different forms of encryption both have advantages and disadvantages. The
advantage of using symmetric key encryption is that is much faster than asymmetric key
encryption, however it has the disadvantage that users must first find a means of securely
exchanging keys. In the example above, Alice and Bob simply decided on the password
"2", but how did they correspond that this would be the password? They could have
exchanged the password over the phone or by email, but these aren't secure methods of
exchange because the phone could have been tapped or the email could have been
compromised during transfer. In order to exchange passwords, a secure protocol must be
used to exchange keys. Conversely, asymmetric key encryption does not require an
additional protocol to exchange keys because key exchange is unnecessary. However,
asymmetric key encryption is much slower and is thus rarely used to encrypt any long
sessions. Often a combination of the two encryption schemes is used to generate a secure
session. For example, two users might use asymmetric key encryption to exchange keys
that will be used to symmetrically encrypt a session.
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The term hashfunction H(m) is used to describe a transformation that takes in some input
message m and returns a fixed-size output h=H(m) called a hash value. Cryptographic
hash functions have the following properties:
The input m can be of any length
The output has a fixed length
H(x) is relatively easy to compute given x
H(x) is one-way
H(x) is collision-free
The term one-way is used to describe a hash function that is hard to invert. That is, given
a hash value h, it is computationally infeasible to find some input m such that H(m) = h.
The term collision-free describes a hash function such that it is computationally infeasible
to find any two messages x and y such that H(x) = H(y). Hash functions are generally
faster than encryption algorithms, and the hash value of a document is generally smaller
than the document itself. These two properties make hash functions an ideal method for
message integrity checks and digital signatures. Some of the more common hash
functions used are MD2, MD5, and SHA [18].
The term digital signature refers to the method of using public and private keys to
authenticate that a message has come from a certain person. Signing can be done using
public-key signatures (similar to public-key encryption described above). To encrypt
messages using public-key encryption, a sender encrypts a message with the receiver's
public key and the receiver decrypts the message with the private key. Digital signatures
21
reverse the roles of the keys. That is, to digitally sign a document, the signer encrypts the
document with his or her private key, and anyone else can verify the signature by
decrypting the document with the public key. Signing a large document using public or
private keys can be slow, so documents are generally hashed before they are signed. The
signer hashes the documents, encrypts the hash of the document and sends both the
plaintext document and the encrypted hash to the receiver. The receiver verifies the
signature by decrypting the hash and comparing it to a hash of the plaintext document; if
the two are the same, then the receiver has successfully verified the signature. The RSA
algorithm is also the de facto method for digital signing [19].
Figures 5-1 and 5-2 illustrate the process of digitally signing and verifying a document.
Signature Generation
Plaintext Signed Document
Plaintext
Plaintext7
-- *Ha~h Encrypt Ciphertext
Kprivate
Figure 5-1
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Signature Verification
Signed Document
Plaintext Hash
Compare
FCiphertext Decrypt
Figure 5-2
23
6. A Check-Processing Protocol
Gupta and Palacios define a sound framework for secure web check processing, but they
leave the precise cryptographic protocols open for future specification. This section
defines the specific cryptographic protocol that accomplishes the four design goals
defined in Section 4.
6.1 Depositing a Check
Before a check can be entered into the electronic check processing system, its MICR
information must be read, and the check amount read in through an OCR process. The
Gupta and Palacios paper [15] provides a solid foundation for the this process; in
summary, the bank where the check is deposited is responsible for the scanning of the
check, the extraction of the check's electronic information, and the check's submission to
the central check processing facility.
An electronic check consists of the following six pieces of information:
1. Routing number
2. Account number
MICR The routing number (also known as ABA Number)
uniquely identifies the check-writer's bank.
MICR The account number uniquely identifies the
customer's account at the bank.
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3. Check number
4. Check amount
5. Image of check front
6. Image of check back
MICR The check number uniquely identifies the
instrument number for a particular account
OCR The amount is extracted from both the Courtesy
Amount Block (CAB) and the Legal Amount
Block (LAB). Ostensibly if it cannot be read in via
OCR, it must be input by a human.
Scan The check's image is provided as a reference.
Scan
These data fields will hereinafter collectively be known as the "check data block" or
simply "check data." The depositing bank must upload this check data to the central
processing server, and it must generate a digital signature that will later be used to
validate the authenticity of the check data.
To generate the digital signature, the depositor' bank simply signs the hash of the check
data and a timestamp. Mathematically, this is:
Sdepositor = SignPKdepositor ( Hash(CheckData), timestamp)
Section 5 provides an overview of digital signatures and hash functions. One nuance:
note that the digital signature is of the hash of the check data. This optimization was
made to increase the privacy of the system. Other banks will frequently ask questions
such as "was check X" signed? In order to ask this question, the bank must send the
central processing system information to identify check X. Rather than send the entire
check data structure each time, which contains sensitive information and may be fairly
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large (because of the scanned check images), the banks can simply send a hash of the
check data. It's safe to assume that a hash collision is exceedingly rare, and that a check's
hash can be used to uniquely identify each check.
The central check processing system must send back an acknowledgement of the receipt
of each check. This acknowledgement takes the form of the server's digital signature of
Sdepositor and a timestamp. Mathematically:
Sreceipt. SignPKserver (Sdepositor 9' mestamp)
Depositing a Check
Central Processing Bank
>OCR Sign Sign
4-- PKserver
PKdepositor
Depositor's
Bank
Figure 6-1
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6.2 Clearing a Check
Each member bank should check the central processing system at regular intervals and
process any pending checks. Gupta and Palacios [15] stipulate that member banks must
process any pending checks within one day. The check-writer's bank can either accept
the check or decline the check. Gupta and Palacios simply define a "clear code," and
leave open the specifics of this clear code. This section cryptographically defines the
clear code.
Before the check-writer's bank can accept or decline the check, it must validate the
digital signature Sdepositor . To do this, it must first securely obtain PKdepositor , and
verify its authenticity. The exact mechanics of key distribution and authentication are
described in Section 7. If Sdepositor is not a valid digital signature, then the check-
writer's bank should decline the check.
This verification step does not prevent physically forged checks from being submitted to
the system; i.e. it does not verify the check-writer's intent, it only verifies that the check
was deposited at a recognized bank. An unrecognized bank would have an
unrecognized PKdepositor , or a corrupt check would have an incorrect Sdepositor
To accept a check, the depositor's bank signs the hash of the check data and a timestamp.
Mathematically:
Sclearcode Sign PKoriginator (' accept', depositor , hash (CheckData), timestamp)
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A bank might wish to decline a check for any number of reasons:
- The originator (the check writer) might have insufficient funds in his account
- Any aspect of the electronically transcribed data might be incorrect (i.e. the check
number or the check amount). The administrative protocols to correct these errors
are beyond the scope of this thesis, but, obviously, such errors must be handled by
the system.
" If Sdepositor is not a valid digital signature by PKdeositor.
To decline a check, the check-writer's bank generates a virtually identical message:
Sdecline d Sign PKoriginator ('decline', S hash(CheckData), timestamp)
This clear code, Sclearcode, is irrefutable proof that the check-writer's bank has accepted
the check for further processing. If the bank has generated an accept message, then the
protocol dictates that it must honor any wire transfers associated with this check.
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Clearing a Check
Central Processing Bank
receive
pending checks
check for
pending checks Bank
oVerify Sign
Check
Writers Bank
PKdepositor PKoriginator
Figure 6-2
6.3 Obtaining a Clear Code
The depositing bank must monitor the central check processing system and determine if
any of the checks it has posted have cleared, and if they have been cleared, if they have
been approved or denied. The check writer's bank is obligated, by the standards set in
[15] to process posted checks within one day.
To verify a check's approval or denial, the depositing bank must obtain PKoriginator and
verify that PKoriginator signed Sclearcode, and that Sdepositor and
hash(CheckData) both refer to the original check posted by the depositor. If
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Sclearcode passes all of these tests, then it is a valid accept message, and it can go ahead
and originate a wire transfer.
Obtaining a Clear Code
anm IM=l X= j=1
check for
cleared checks Central Processing Bank
receive
cleared checks
SSuccessful
Verify omaiCompare -1ons Wire Transfer
Depositor's
Bank T T
PKorginator original
check
Figure 6-3
6.4 Wire Transfer
To originate a wire transfer, the depositor must send a signed request to the check-
writer's bank in the following form:
S ,.emansfe, = SignlPKdepositr (fWireTransferRoutingDetails, hash(CheckData))
SWireTransfer is a signed message that contains the depositor's wire transfer details. This
message must be signed by PKdepositor ; if the message was unsigned, than any
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fortuitous eavesdropper could send the check-writer's bank a wire transfer initiation
message and claim the check-writer's funds.
As described in [15], the check-writer's bank does not initiate the wire transfer upon
clearing the check; it waits for the SWireTransfer message from the depositor's bank
before proceeding.
The check-writing bank must only initiate one wire-transfer for each check; after a single
SwireTransfer is received, it must refuse any additional SWireTransfer messages, even if
properly signed, for that specific check.
Wire Transfer
PKdepositor
wire transfer
if verification
successful
JBonk I
Depositor's
Bank
4Verify
BJ nk L -
Check
Writers Bank
wiretransfer Sg
request
PKdepositor
Figure 6-4
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7. Authentication Hierarchy
Before any communication is initiated, both parties must be authenticated; that is, it must
be verified that both parties are who they claim to be. The authentication system
described in this section accomplishes these goals.
7.1 Public Key Infrastructure/Key Distribution
Asymmetric key encryption algorithms such as RSA do a good job of providing secure,
authenticated communication between two parties who know each other's public keys,
but the encryption and authentication is for naught if you have mistakenly opened up an
encrypted connection between yourself and an adversary. Public Key Infrastructures
(PKIs) provide mechanisms for the secure distribution of public keys.
This thesis focuses on hierarchical PKIs that terminate at a root Certificate Authority
(CA). In such systems, CAs issue certificates binding public keys to identifying
information. Hierarchical systems place total trust in the Certificate Authorities; users of
the system trust that the CA has performed the necessary due diligence to ensure that a
public key that purports to be for "Alice" is actually owned by Alice. The certificates
issued by the CAs often take a form dictated by the X.509 v3 protocol. Revocation is
performed by CA's using frequently updated Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL's) as
defined in Internet RFC 2459 [22].
There are a number of design directions:
32
A central key server: This design involves a central server that maintains every
"individual -> Public Key" mapping in the system. However, this is infeasible
because a central authority cannot possibly perform adequate due diligence for
millions of users.
A PGP-like Web of Trust: This design involves a decentralized method by which
users are authenticated by their peers. For example, if Alice and Bob trust each other,
and Bob and Charlie trust each other, then Alice and Charlie can trust each other
because they have been deemed "trustworthy" by their mutual friend Bob. A
decentralized system has numerous benefits, but a web of trust provides only a
"fuzzy" guarantee of correspondence between a specific individual and a specific
public key. Consider the situation where you must accept the public key of someone
for whom there are 6 degrees of separation-can they really be trusted? In this case,
where banks are transferring millions of dollars at a time, a fuzzy assurance of
authentication is not good enough.
A hierarchical PKI: In this system, a central CA certifies individual organizations,
but each individual organization is responsible for certifying its own users. For
example, your group certifies that you are an employee, the department certifies that
your group is valid, the company certifies that the department is legitimate, and so on
until you reach the Certificate Authority. The check processing system uses such a
hierarchical PKI.
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7.2 Authentication Hierarchy
This hierarchical system greatly reduces the burden on any central CA. Rather than
certifying the identity of every individual user of the system, the central CA only has to
certify the validity of organizations. It must perform the necessary due diligence to ensure
that the user who purports to be "Federal Reserve Bank of New York" is in fact the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY), but it only needs to do this due diligence
once for the entire organization. When it certifies FRBNY's public key, it gives FRBNY
complete power over the Second Federal Reserve District for which it has supervisory
jurisdiction over [11].
FRBNY can then divvy up its domain into smaller components such as regional offices.
FRBNY has supervisory jurisdiction over all of New York State, the 12 northern counties
of New Jersey, Fairfield County in Connecticut, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands [11];
maintaining a central key distribution server that must authenticate each bank in these
areas would be infeasible. Instead, FRBNY can use hierarchy to simplify the task--it
could, for example, further subdivide by regional offices or bank corporations, such as
Fleet or Chase Manhattan. Each of these can in turn subdivide into individual banks and
so on. The key strategy is to use hierarchy to reduce the administrative burden of
certifying an individual user to a manageable problem.
The hierarchical protocol outlined in Figure 7-1 below details the certification process
required to prove that a given public key, PKFB, is the correct public key for Fleet Bank
#206 in Boston, MA.
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Figure 7-1: How to Authenicate
Fleet Bank 206
Obtain PKFI,,. Has PK,,
signed PKFB206?
No ?
Fail
Obtain PuRNY. Has
PKFsRBNYsagned PKFietB
Fail
We have PK CA (given). Has
PKCA sed PK FRBNY?
No?
Fail
Authentication Succeeded!
.7.3 Key Lookup
The hierarchical design of the system also lends itself to an efficient key-lookup
mechanism. A hierarchical, caching key lookup system distributes key lookup traffic. For
sake of ease, the notation FB206@Fleet.FRBNY is used to indicate that Fleet Bank #206
(FB206) falls under the domain of Fleet, which falls under the domain of the FRBNY.
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This notation is similar to email addresses used at corporations that are divided by groups
or departments. This key lookup scheme is very similar to the Domain Name Server
(DNS) name resolution scheme and this notation is, in fact, a very useful way to
incorporate the key lookup scheme into currently existing technology. An example of this
lookup scheme is shown in figure 7-2 below.
Figure 7-2: PKI lookup
Every public key is stored at a primary server that corresponds to the domain under
which a user falls. For example, FRBNY.Fleet could be the primary key server for Fleet
Bank #206 because it falls under the domain of Fleet. Similarly, FRBNY could be the
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Chase 1 04@Chase.FRBNY
looking for cert on
FB206@Fleet.FRBNY
Chase.RBNY-4 (optional) FRBNY
Fleet.FRB
primary server for Fleet because it falls under the domain of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York.
When a user in the system wants to send data to FB206@Fleet.FRBNY, it queries its
local key server. When a key lookup server receives a request for a username's public
key, it:
1. Tries to fulfill the request using its database of user keys (i.e. if it is the primary
server for a given public key, then it can fulfill the request immediately).
2. Tries to fulfill the request using its cache of 3'd party username -> PKusername
mappings.
3. Otherwise, it queries the primary server for the username (i.e. Fleet.FRBNY),
retrieves the public key, stores it in its cache, and passes the public key on to the user.
A key lookup server can optionally retrieve the public keys for the rest of the servers
in the lookup hierarchy, as they are needed in the key authentication process. A key
server may wish to perform authentication itself to prevent corrupt entries from being
stored in its cache.
CRLs are kept by the primary server for a username, and a key server is only allowed to
revoke keys that are in its namespace.
This trust model assumes that the public keys for the root CA servers are stored in the
software and are correct. If an adversary is able to tamper with the root public keys in a
software distribution, then the adversary can undermine the entire PKI infrastructure.
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7.4 Goals Achieved
The authentication scheme described above helps one achieve three of the system's goals:
authentication, flexibility, and scalability.
Authentication for users is achieved because each user in the system can be authenticated
by a user that is one level higher in the hierarchy, and eventually a user will be
authenticated by the Certificate Authority who can be supremely trusted.
The scheme also offers flexibility because it allows the system to change without
requiring drastic changes in authentication. Take for example, the merging of Bank
Boston and Fleet Bank: in the defined authentication scheme, a Bank Boston #54 would
have been identified as BB54@BankBoston.FRBNY. When it merges with Fleet Bank
and becomes Fleet Banks 3 0 7th bank, it can simply change its identifier to
FB307@Fleet.FRBNY. This means that the Bank is now authenticated by Fleet rather
than Bank Boston. However, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York has to make no
changes-only Fleet is required to add new branches to its domain.
Finally, the hierarchical authentication allows a great deal of scalability. As in the
previous paragraph, only the bank needed to do minor work to add a new branch to the
system. Even if a new bank, Example Bank, were to open up 25 branches in the state of
New York, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York would only need to add one new user
to its domain, and the Example Bank would only need to add 25. If every user in the
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hierarchy were to authenticate 100 users in the level below, a relatively low number, and
the hierarchy were only 4 levels deep, 100 million users could be authenticated!
Considering that users are not individual people, but bank branches or banks, there is
more than enough room for growth in the system.
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8. Protocol Attacks
The following section describes a number of attacks on the secure check protocol defined
in Section 6.
8.1 Domain Name Spoofing Attack
This attack allows a clever adversary to convince users of web browsers at the check-
writer's bank or the depositor's bank that they are the central check-processing server.
The DNS system [16] is a hierarchical caching system whose sole job is to resolve textual
domain names such as 'mit.edu' into IP addresses such as '18.7.22.69'. There are sets of
high-level DNS servers that contain information about every host on the Internet, but to
prevent these servers from being overwhelmed, this information is propagated down to
lower-level servers. Typically, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) maintain domain name
servers for their clients. If the ISP's domain name server does not know about a specific
name, then the domain name server asks the root servers for information on the domain.
If possible, information is provided from a local cache.
According to Gupta and Palacios [15], member banks will access a centralized web site
via a web browser. The Internet Service Providers for the member banks will have the job
of resolving the domain name of the central check processing server (i.e.
"https://webcheck.bank.com") into an IP address ("1.2.3.4"). If an attacker were to hijack
the ISP's domain name servers, he could redirect all accesses to
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"https://webcheck.bank.com" to his own central check processing server (IP address
"9.9.9.9").
The hijacker will not be able to obtain a valid web certificate that shows that his new
server, "9.9.9.9" is "https://webcheck.bank.com," so a privacy warning dialog will come
up. If a bank user clicks "Yes" on this dialog (Figure 8-1), he can immediately redirect
the bank user to a similarly named web server owned by himself - for example,
"https://webcheck.banks.com" (note the additional "s" on "bank.com"). Because the
attacker owns banks.com, then he can obtain a valid web certificate for banks.com and
the web browser will not alert the user of any errors.
Figure 8-1
At this point in time, the clerk at the member bank believes that the attacker's central
check processing server is the correct central check processing server. The next section,
41
Section 8.2, discusses the effects of a rogue central server on the system. Web browsers
are, by default, configured to accept the SSL certificate of any web server if the SSL
certificate is signed by one of a select few recognized root level Certificate Authorities
(CAs) such as Verisign or Thawte. Verisign and Thawte will grant a SSL certificate to
anyone who can prove that they own the domain name in question - i.e. an attacker
would have no problem obtaining a SSL certificate for https://webcheck.banks.com. The
solution is to specially configure the web browsers of the member bank computers to
only recognize certificates signed by a special bank-only root CA.
8.2 Rogue Central Server
Section 8.1 described how an attacker could gain control of the central check processing
server. This section describes how an attacker who has gained control of the central
server, regardless of the specific method used to gain control, could disrupt the
functioning of the system.
8.2.1 Birthday Paradox: Attack on the Hashes
A rogue central server could, by transferring money between accounts at different
member banks, accumulate money. This attack is statistically difficult, but theoretically
possible.
In this system, checks are identified by their hashes - i.e. hash(CheckData) is assumed to
uniquely identify a check. Because hash functions are difficult to invert (see Section 5),
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given a hash function that produces an n-bit output, one would expect to need, on
average, 2"' trials to find a new hash value, hash(CheckData2)=hash(CheckData).
SHA 1, a popular hash function widely considered to be secure, produces a 160-bit output.
2159 is roughly 7.3 x 1047; it is clearly computationally intractable to find a hash collision.
However, an attacker can exploit the birthday paradox. While it might be very difficult
to, given a specific hash(CheckData), find another hash(CheckData2) =hash(CheckData),
it's significantly easier to find any two hashes CD] and CD2 such that
hash(CD1)=hash(CD2). This is the heart of the birthday paradox; you can find a hash
collision in about sqrt(2"), or 2"/, rather than in 2"- . For SHA l, this is 2'0, or about 1.2 x
1024 . Even with the birthday paradox, finding hash collisions is not computationally
tractable. Assuming that an adversary has at its disposal 1,000 computers each capable of
performing 1 billion hash comparisons per second, it would take about 33,000 years to
find a hash collision.
Let's assume that there is an exponential increase in computational power and that it's
tractable to find two hashes CD] and CD2 such that hash(CD)=hash(CD2). CDI and
CD2 represent two checks draw on the same account - the attacker's account - but with
different amounts, say X, and X2, respectively. Let's say that X1 > X 2 .
A rogue central server can deposit check CD1 with value Xi in an account it owns at a
member bank. When the depositing bank forwards the central server CD 1, then the check
processing server can replace CD 1 with CD2 (because hash(CD) =hash(CD2)). The
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check-writing server will then deduct X2 from the attacker's account, but the depositing
bank will add X, to the attacker's account. The attacker has made a profit of XI - X2.
8.2.2 Receipt Forgery
A receipt forgery is not a serious attack. Because the attacker has control of the central
server, he could forge the timestamps on the receipts,
Sreceipt =SignPKserver (Sdepositor , timestamP) . However, this has no monetary
impact on the system; these receipts are only used to verify the depositor's submission
and to enforce the constraint that member banks must either accept or deny checks in one
day.
8.3 Rogue Check-Writer's Bank
The check-writer's bank is only debited money; there is little opportunity for it to profit
by taking advantage of the protocol. In fact, it has the most to gain by enforcing the
protocol well; it is in the check-writing bank's interest to only send money to valid
depositors.
8.4 Rogue Depositors
8.4.1 Traditional Check Forgery
A rogue depositor can forge checks and deposit these in its accounts. However, this is
little different from traditional check forgery. This thesis does not address the issue of
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check forgery; i.e. how to prevent checks from being written without the check-writer's
authorization. The web-based check processing system described in this thesis does not
make it more or less difficult for traditional check forgery to occur.
8.4.2 Replay Attack
A rogue depositor can replay wire transfer messages, SwireTransfer , but the check
writer's bank should ensure that it only sends money if the following conditions are met:
= The wire transfer message is from the appropriate member bank - the member bank
which initiated the deposit
" At most one successful wire transfer will be sent to the depositor's bank
This prevents a replay attack:
- If a rogue depositor forges a SWireTransfer , the check writer's bank will refuse the
wire transfer request because the bank requesting the wire transfer does not match the
bank that initiated the check deposit
" If an attacker observes the depositor's valid SWireTransfer message and replays this
message, the check writer's bank will take no action because it has already initiated a
wire transfer for this instrument.
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9. System Integration
Given the flexibility and scalability of the system, the electronic checking system above
can be easily integrated into any currently existing banking system. Whether simple or
complex, the design described above can accommodate for the banking system's current
checking route. The design above allows any user to securely pass information onto any
other user, so that each stop on a check's route can be made a user in the system. Rather
than mailing the physical check to the next stop on the check's route, the user can send
the check over the Internet using the scheme described above.
A check that enters the iCheck system might follow such a route:
A user deposits a check at a bank. Checks will be scanned at a particular physical
location depending on the checking system. Some possibilities include:
Branch-based check processing: Checks would not have to be shipped anywhere
to be scanned, but every bank branch would need to have access to a scanner.
Additionally, every bank is legally obligated to store the checks for 7 years so the
bank branch would be required to have the storage space to warehouse the
physical checks [1].
Regional processing: Regional processing is an intermediate solution that
requires less shipping than a national scanning architecture, and requires fewer
scanners than a branch-based scanning scheme.
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National processing: A national processing scheme would require a central check
processing location where every check would need to be shipped, but you get the
best economies of scale.
ATM-based processing: An ATM-based scheme would require payees to scan
their checks in at an ATM. This allows the payee, who has the strongest interest
in seeing his or her check get processed quickly and correctly, verify that a check
has been properly scanned in. Once the check has been scanned, the electronic
picture can be read using OCR at some other location. It is important to determine
the percentage of checks that are processed via ATMs to judge the usefulness of
this scheme.
Once a check has been scanned and read it becomes an e-check. The bank must store it
electronically and credit its customer's account with the appropriate amount. The e-check
is then electronically sent to the depositing bank using the encryption scheme described
in section 4. The receiving bank must be a user in the encryption system in order to
properly receive the e-check.
Whether the bank branch sends the e-check directly to the receiver's bank or to one of its
central servers is unimportant because of the flexibility the system offers. In fact, the
bank branch can send the information to both the receiver's bank and to its central server.
The added advantage of sending e-checks is that the check can be duplicated and sent to
two different recipients, whereas a physical check cannot be duplicated and must be sent
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to recipients one at a time. The ability to duplicate a check helps to save time, and the
reduced cost of sending it over the Internet helps to save money.
When the receiver's bank obtains the e-check, it can verify the signature via the
authentication scheme described in Section 7. Once a signature has been verified, the
bank then stores the encrypted check and debits the money from their customer's
account. The check will be noted on the customers' next bank statements.
The scenario described above requires certain new technologies to be integrated at each
location that sends or receives a check. Every location receiving a paper check to be
scanned would need to obtain scanning hardware and OCR software. Any facility that
sends or receives an e-check needs to obtain public keys and needs to install encryption
software onto their computers. Facilities that store digital archives of checks would need
to purchase hardware to store this data. And finally, banks receiving e-checks need to set
up a system to receive the checks and to automatically add the check onto the customer's
periodic bank statement.
48
10. Bibliography
[1] "Banks hope to end paper chase." CNet News.com. October 2002.
http://news.com.com/2100-1017-96091 1.html
[2] Rui Tang. May 2003.
http://mit.edu/dewdrop/Public/intemational checks/visionjpaper.doc
[3] "Section-by-Section Analysis." The Federal Reserve Board. March 2002.
http://www.federaireserve.gov/paymentsystems/truncation/proposed.htm
[4] "Cheque Truncation System." BCS Information Systems Private Limited.
http://www.bcsis.com/products9.html
[5] http://web.mit.edu/tedlow/profit/upload/
[6] "Improving the Processing of Handwritten Bank Checks." Winnie Chan. May
2002. http://profit.mit.edu/PDFS/WinnieChan.pdf
[7] "Character Segmentation Heuristics for Check Amount Verification." Salman
Amin Khan. June 1998. http://profit.mit.edu/PDFS/salkhanthesis.pdf
[8] "QSC (Quick Start Control): A Flexible Control System." Conix Systems. May
2003. http://www.conixsystems.com/products/qsc.shtml
[9] "Fed To Launch New Electronic Check Processing System." Dow Jones
Newswires. May 2002. http://mitsloan.mit.edu/news/releases/2002/gupta.html
[10] "Frequently Asked Questions." The Federal Reserve Board. May 2003.
http://www.federalreserve.gov/faq.htm
[11] "Introduction to the New York Fed." The Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
May 2003. http://www.ny.frb.org/introduce/?expand=l
49
[12] http://www.soi.wide.ad.jp/class/20000009/slides/08/5.html
[13] "iCheck: An Architecture for Secure Transactions in Processing Bank Checks."
Joe Figuero. June 1997.
[14] "Contemporary Bank Check Alternatives." Adam Garner. May 2003.
[15] "Description of Web-Based Check Processing." A. Gupta, R. Palacios.
http://www.iit.upco.es/palacios/web-check processing/intro.html
[16] "RFC 921: Domain Name System Implementation Schedule." Postel, J.
http://www.zoneedit.com/doc/rfc/rfc921.txt. October 1984
[17] "The Birthday Paradox" Jenkins, Bob.
http://burtleburtle.net/bob/hash/birthday.html
[18] "What is a Hash Function?" RSA Laboratories.
http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/faq/2-1-6.html. August 2003
[19] "Digital Signatures".
http://www5conf.inria.fr/fichhtml/slides/tutorials/T1/background/RESCUE3.HT
M. August 2003
[20] "A Multi-Layered Corroboration-Based Check Reader." Shridar, M.
http://www.alumni.caltech.edu/~dave/dasbook/dasbook.html
[21] Schneier, B. "Applied Cryptography: Protocols, Algorithms, and Source code in
C, Second Edition". John Wiley & Sons.
[22] "RFC 2459: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL
Profile." Housley, R., et. al. January 1999. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2459.txt
[23] Gupta, Amar. "Technology - Check Processing." LokVani.com. February 2003.
50
[24] "Risk to Financial Institutions Using the Automated Clearing House for Large
Payments." http://www.nacha.org/OtherResources/riskmgmt/FIRisk.pdf
51
